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§ 510(c) Equitable Subordination?
Matthew Nozemack
L Introduction
In order to remedy creditor misconduct that harms the debtor or other
creditors,' bankruptcy courts have the authority to subordinate claims in
bankruptcy on equitable grounds.2 The courts remedy creditor misconduct by
moving otherwise valid, superior claims behind inferior claims.3 The subordi-
nated claims receive a distribution from the bankruptcy estate only after the
* The author would like to thank Professor Joseph Ulrich for his help in developing this
Note and for providing his knowledge and expertise in the field of bankruptcy law.
1. See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 733 (1946) (stating that equitable principles
allow subordination of creditor's claims to prevent consummation of course of conduct that
would prove fraudulent or inequitable to other claimants).
2. See Pepperv. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,308 (1939) (stating that bankruptcy courts exam-
ine circumstances surrounding claims to "see that injustice or unfairness is not done in adminis-
tration of the bankrupt estate"); 4 LAWRENCE P. KING ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
510.05, at 510-12 (15th ed. 1997) (discussing bankruptcy courts' authority to subordinate
claims under principles of equitable subordination); Andrew DeNatale & Prudence B. Abram,
The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination as Applied to Nonmanagement Creditors, 40 Bus.
LAW. 417, 421 (1985) (discussing bankruptcy courts' review of claims).
3. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306 (discussing authority to subordinate otherwise valid
claim behind other claims under principles of equity); see also ROBERT L. JORDAN & WILLIAM
D. WARREN, BANKRUPTCY 30 (4th ed. 1995) (discussing distribution of assets in bankruptcy).
The harsh effect of subordinating claims below other unsecured creditors results from the
general order of distribution in bankruptcy proceedings. Id. Secured creditors have claims to
specific property of the bankrupt debtor. Id. The trustee first distributes estate property to.
satisfy secured claims. Id. The trustee distributes the remaining property among various
claimants according to § 726 of the Bankruptcy Code (Code). Id. Under § 726, the first
disbursement of property is to expenses and claims with priority under § 507. Id Administra-
tive expenses described in § 503 are given first priority. Id. Next, the trustee pays the addi-
tional priority claimants listed in order under § 507. Id. After the estate pays all priority claims,
it distributes property to the remaining unsecured creditors pursuant to § 726. Id These
unsecured claims are ordinarily paid on a pro-rata basis because the estate normally distributes
all available property before being able to satisfy the unsecured claims fully. Id. In the
extremely rare situation in which the estate fully satisfies claims of all unsecured creditors, any
remaining property would be distributed back to equity holders. Id.
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estate satisfies all the superior claims.' Although bankruptcy courts had exer-
cised equitable jurisdiction for years,5 in 1978, Congress finally codified the
bankruptcy courts' use of equitable subordination in § 510(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code (Code).'
Despite the availability of § 510(c) equitable subordination, some bank-
ruptcy courts have achieved the same remedial result by recharacterizing
purported debt transactions as equity contributions by using the bankruptcy
courts' general equitable powers.7 Bankruptcy courts have based these
recharacterizations on § 105 of the Code, which grants bankruptcy judges the
authority to "issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appro-
priate to carry out the provisions" of the Code.' Bankruptcy courts have
pointed to their authority to disregard the form of a transaction and to deter-
mine its true substance to supporttheirrecharacterization of claims.9 The lack
of a specific code provision governing recharacterization of claims, however,
has left the courts with a large number of factors to sort through when consid-
ering whether to recharacterize a transaction.' 0
4. 4 KINGETAL., supra note 2, 510.01, at 510-13.
5. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's exercise
of equitable jurisdiction to subordinate claims in two 1939 decisions).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994). Equitable subordination allows a bankruptcy court to
reorder existing priorities among creditors. The subordination provision of the Code provides:
Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing,
the court may -
(1) underprinciples ofequitable subordination, subordinate forpurposes ofdistribu-
tion all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part
of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed interest; or
(2) order thatany lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the estate.
Id
7. SeegenerallyUnsecured Creditors' Comms. ofPac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commer-
cial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
bankruptcy court cannot allow recharacterization of purported loans into equity transactions
because § 510(c) of Bankruptcy Code governs result of subordination that recharacterization
achieves); Pinetree Partners, Ltd. v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (In re Pinetree Partners,
Ltd.), 87 B.R. 481 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (same). Recharacterizing a claimant's transaction
from debt to equity moves the claimant firther down the line in bankruptcy proceedings. If the
court considers the transaction to be a debt or loan, the bankruptcy trustee pays the claimant with
the other unsecured creditors. Once the court recharacterizes the claim as an equity transaction,
the claimant must wait and see if the bankruptcy estate has enough capital to satisfy the unse-
cured claims in their entirety because only then will the trustee begin to pay the equity holders.
8. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a).
9. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939) (stating that bankruptcy court's
equitable powers enable it to look past form of transaction to its substance in determining
whether to treat transaction as debt or equity).
10. See infra note 143 (listing factors courts consider in determining whether to subordi-
nate transaction).
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According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's (B.A.P.)1' decision in Unsecured Creditors'
Committees ofPacific Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In
re Pacific Express, Inc.), 2 bankruptcy courts do not have the authority to
recharacterize debt into equity. 3 The Pacific Express panel determined that
the Code does not provide for the characterization of claims as debt or
equity. 4 The B.A.P. refused to adopt the tax court's analysis to determine
whether an advance is a loan or capital contribution.'5 The panel rejected this
11. See JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 3, at 940-43 (discussing formation and jurisdic-
tion ofBankruptcyAppellatePanels). In 1994, Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 158(b) to require
the establishment of Bankruptcy Appellate Panels (B.A.P.) in each circuit unless the circuit's
judicial council determines that insufficient judicial resources prevent establishing B.A.P.s or
that the B.A.P. would create undue delay or increased cost to parties. Id. at 941. A majority of
district judges must vote to authorize a B.A.P. to hear an appeal. Id. Any party to the case may
elect for the district court, instead ofa B.A.P., to hear the appeal. Id The Ninth Circuit B.A.P.
has operated since the Code went into effect in 1978. Id. The Ninth Circuit B.A.P. consists of
rotating panels of three ordinary bankruptcy judges from within the circuit, but outside the
district from which the appeal arises. Id. Appeals from bankruptcy courts initially go to either
the district court or to a B.A.P. Id After the district court or the B.A.P. hears the case, the case
can go to a United States Court of Appeals and perhaps to the Supreme Court. Id. at 942. The
Supreme Court normally hears between five to seven bankruptcy appeals per year. Id.
12. 69 B.R. 112 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986).
13. See Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (conclud-
ing that Code provisions do not provide for characterization of claims in bankruptcy as equity
or debt). In Pacific Express, theNinth CircuitB.A.P. considered whetherthe Bankruptcy Code
provided a basis for the characterization ofclaims as debtor equity. Id. An unsecured creditors
committee filed a complaint to determine the status of creditors' claims against a collection
agency and the participants in a loan participation agreement. Id at 114. The bankruptcy court
found that the transactions should be classified as a stock transfer rather than as a secured loan.
Id The court found that the participation agreement was not an arm's length transaction and
was an equity investment rather than a loan. Id. at 115. The court stated that its power to
recharacterize the claims was consistent with the Code. Id. The B.A.P. reversed the lower
court, stating that the result achieved by recharacterizing the claims - subordination - is
governed by § 5 10(c) of the Code. Id. The B.A.P. vacated the bankruptcy court's characteriza-
tion of the transaction as an equity contribution rather than as a loan. Id. The B.A.P. also
considered whether the claims should be subordinated under § 510(c), and it determined that
no inequitable conduct was present. Id. at 118. Consequently, the B.A.P. reversed the lower
court and held that the claims should neither be reclassified nor subordinated. Id.; see In re
Lewiston Steam & PowerAssocs.,No. B86-00477-Y, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS 1382, at * 12 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 1989) (holding recharacterization of loans as equity contributions outside
power of bankruptcy court); Pinetree Partners, Ltd. v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (In re
Pinetree Partners, Ltd.), 87 B.R. 481, 491 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) (holding that bankruptcy
courts cannot recharacterize claims because Code provisions do not support such action).
14. See Pacific Express, 69 B.R. at 115 (stating that Code supports court's ability to
determine amount and allowance of claim but not its character).
15. See id. (claiming factors tax court utilized to determine classification of transaction
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analysis as irrelevant, but never stated how it reached that conclusion. 6 The
B.A.P. ruled that § 510(c) equitable subordination governs all actions result-
ing in the subordination of claims in bankruptcy proceedings.'
7
This Note examines the practice ofrecharacterizing claims in bd.nkruptcy
proceedings and considers whether recharacterization differs materially from
§ 510(c) equitable subordination. To answer this question, this Note evaluates
why the Pacific Express B.A.P. prohibited bankruptcy judges from going
beyond traditional § 510(c) equitable subordination concepts to subordinate
claims. Part II discusses the evolution of equitable subordination and how
bankruptcy courts apply § 510(c) to equitably subordinate claims.'8 Part m
examines when and why some courts choose to recharacterize transactions
from debt to equity instead of using § 510(c) to subordinate claims in bank-
ruptcy. 9 Part IV takes a closer look at Pacific Express and the Ninth Circuit's
prohibition of the recharacterization of claims in bankruptcy proceedings. 0
Part V analyzes the reasons why bankruptcy courts choose to recharacterize
certain transactions in bankruptcy.2 ThisNote ultimately concludes that bank-
ruptcy courts should have the authority to recharacterize claims using the tax
court factors. However, the bankruptcy courts should examine these factors
as a group and avoid subordinating or recharacterizing claims based solely on
the debtor's undercapitalization or inability to procure outside financing from
disinterested lenders.
II. The Doctrine of Equitable Subordination
Bankruptcy courts are traditionally regarded as courts of equity?2 The
doctrine of equitable subordination derives from this equitable jurisdic-
are irrelevant for bankruptcy purposes); see also infra note 143 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing factors normally used by tax court to determine classification of transaction).
16. Pacific Express, 69 B.R. at 115.
17. Id at 115-16 (noting appropriate test to use in considering whether to subordinate
claim is equitable subordination under § 510(c)).
18. See infra Part II (discussing evolution and application of doctrine of equitable sub-
ordination).
19. See infra Part III (discussing bankruptcy courts' practice of recharacterizing debt to
equity).
20. See infra Part IV (discussingPacificExpress and reasons for not allowing bankruptcy
courts to recharacterize claims).
21. See infra Part V (discussing need for bankruptcy courts to disregard form of some
transactions in bankruptcy and determine true substance).
22. See Sampsell v. Imperial Paper& ColorCorp., 313 U.S. 215,219(1941) (stating that
"the theme of the BankruptcyAct is equality of distribution"); Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S.
234, 240 (1934) (examining equity jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts); Clarke v. Rogers, 228
U.S. 534, 548 (1913) (stating that equality among creditors is aim of bankruptcy law); Corley
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tion.?3 Although the substantive laws of bankruptcy normally achieve fair
results for all interested parties, occasionally a narrow interpretation of the
laws produces an unjust result.24 The bankruptcy courts avoid unjust results
by exercising their equitable powers to subordinate claims of wrongdoing
creditors.2 The courts examine a claimant's conduct in relation to other
creditors to determine whether it is unfair to allow the claimant to share in a
pro rata distribution in bankruptcy with other creditors of equal status.26 The
bankruptcy trustee pays a subordinated claim only after the estate pays all
other creditors ahead of that claim in fill.27
The Supreme Court first recognized the bankruptcy courts' power to
equitably subordinate claims in two cases in 1939.2 Although the Court
failed to provide a framework for applying equitable subordination, most
courts have exercised their equitable powers only after finding inequitable
conduct by the creditor.29 In 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for
v. Cozart, 115 F.2d 119, 121 (5th Cir. 1940) (describing bankruptcy courts as courts of equity
with power to subordinate claims based on equities of case).
23. See Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966) (stating that "there is an
overriding consideration that equitable principles govern the exercise of bankruptcy jurisdic-
tion"); DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 421 (discussing origins of doctrine of equitable
subordination).
24. See DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 419 (discussing bankruptcy court's review
of claims).
25. See Prudence Realization Corp. v. Geist, 316 U.S. 89, 93 (1942) (explaining that
courts use equitable powers to subordinate claim of one claimant to those in same class if
conduct in asserting claim was inequitable); Pepperv. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,306 (1939) (stating
that bankruptcy court may subordinate creditor's claims below other equal-claimants by using
principles of equity).
26. See DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 419 (discussing bankruptcy court's review
of claims).
27. See 4 KING ETAL., supra note 2, 510.01, at 510-13 (discussing general purpose of
equitable subordination).
28. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 308 (stating that "bankruptcy court has the power to sift the
circumstances surrounding any claim to see that injustice or unfairness is not done in adminis-
tration of the bankrupt estate"); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323-24
(1939) (subordinating creditor's claims because of inequitable conduct of creditor through
mismanagement and undercapitalization of bankrupt debtor); see also Comstock v. Group of
Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211,229 (1948) (holding that parent's domination of subsid-
iary did not justify subordination of claim when parent did not use control to its advantage or
to detriment of subsidiary). Comstock narrowed the application of equitable subordination to
situations in which the courts found bad faith by the claimant. Id.
29. See, e.g., Wood v. Richmond (In re Branding Iron Steak House), 536 F.2d 299,302
(9th Cir. 1976) (stating that subordination requires some showing of inequitable conduct
beyond mere initial undercapitalization); Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re
Ahlswede), 516 F.2d 784, 788 (9th Cir. 1975) (requiring inequitable conduct in asserting or
acquiring claim to justify equitable subordination); Gould v. Levin (In re Credit Indus. Corp.),
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the Fifth Circuit parsed the existing case law on equitable subordination
to develop workable criteria for implementing the doctrine.3" Although bank-
ruptcy courts have used their equitable jurisdiction to subordinate claims
for years, Congress finally codified the judicially created doctrine of equi-
table subordination in § 5 10(c) of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.11 Congress
intended for the principles of equitable subordination to follow existing
case law, while leaving bankruptcy courts the ability to further develop the
principles.32
A. The Early Decisions
In 1939, two Supreme Court cases laid the foundation for the develop-
ment of equitable subordination.3 The Supreme Court initially recognized the
bankruptcy courts' equitable authority in Taylor v. Standard Gas & Electric
Co.,34 generally referred to as the Deep Rock decision.3 1 In Deep Rock, the
366 F.2d 402,408-09 (2d Cir. 1966) (noting that courts invoke equitable subordination to deny
equal treatment for creditors engaging in unconscionable or inequitable conduct); Luther v.
United States (In re Garden Grain & Seed Co.), 225 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1954) (same); In
re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 870 (E.D. Pa. 1966) (requiring "convincing proof'
of inequitable conduct of claimant to warrant subordination).
30. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700-01 (5th Cir.
1977) (proposing three conditions derived from prior case law that must be satisfied before
exercising power of equitable subordination); infra notes 46-95 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing Mobile Steel).
31. See supra note 6 (reproducing 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (1994)).
32. 124 CONG. REc. HI 1,095 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id
atS17,412 (daily ed. Oct. 6,1978) (statement ofSen. DeConcini); see supra note 6 (reproducing
11 U.S.C. § 510(c)). Congress did not offer any guidance on the criteria for equitable subordi-
nation in § 510(c), leaving common law principles to control application of the doctrine. Id.
33. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 303-04 (1939); Taylor, 306 U.S. at 307.
34. 306 U.S. 307 (1939).
35. Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939) (holding that parent
company's mismanagement and undercapitalization of subsidiary constituted inequitable
conduct sufficient to subordinate parent's claim in subsidiary's bankruptcy). In Taylor, the
Supreme Court considered the claim of Standard Gas & Electric (Standard), a parent corpora-
tion, against Deep Rock Oil Corporation (Deep Rock), its bankrupt subsidiary. Id. at 309.
Standard controlled all of Deep Rock's finances and served as the subsidiary's lone source of
financial aid. Id. at 311. Deep Rock faced constant financial troubles and was clearly under-
capitalized from its inception. I at 315. The Court reasoned that Deep Rock would not be
regarded as a separate corporate entity when doing so would promote fraud or injustice. Id. at
322. The Court found that Standard caused Deep Rock to enter into several transactions for the
benefit of Standard and to the detriment of Deep Rock and its shareholders. Id. at 320. The
Court concluded that Deep Rock wentbankrupt because ofthe enormous sums it owed Standard
and the abuses in management resulting from Standard's dual role as proprietor and creditor of
Deep Rock. Id. at 323. The Court decided that equity required that the preferred stockholders
of Deep Rock get a superior position in the reorganized company over Standard. Id. Conse-
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Supreme Court considered the bankruptcy claims of a parent corporation
against its subsidiary.36 The parent company's claims arose from loans it
made to the subsidiary.37 The Court determined that the parent company mis-
managed and undercapitalized the subsidiary to the detriment of the subsid-
iary's preferred stockholders." The Court ultimately subordinated the par-
ent's bankruptcy claims to the preferred stockholders' claims because of the
parent's inequitable conduct.39
Later that year, the Supreme Court expanded Deep Rock in Pepper v.
Litton,40 the seminal equitable subordination case.4" InPepper, the Court gave
bankruptcy courts more latitude in applying their equitable powers by sug-
gesting that bankruptcy courts could equitably subordinate claims even
without finding fraud, domination by a shareholder, or undercapitalization of
the corporation.42 The Court indicated that a breach of fiduciary duty by
acting for oneself to the detriment of other shareholders and creditors was
quently, the Taylor Court held that Standard's claims in the reorganized company would be
subordinated to the claims of those preferred stockholders who were injured by Standard's
inequitable conduct. Id. at 324.
36. Id. at 308-09.
37. Id. at311-12.
38. Id. at 323.
39. Id
40. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
41. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1939) (holding that bankruptcy courts have
power to sift circumstances surrounding claim to prevent injustice). In Pepper, the Supreme
Court considered whether a fiduciary's claim should be equitably subordinated if the fiduciary
acted for its own benefit to the detriment of the bankrupt corporation and its creditors and
shareholders. Id. at 311. Pepper brought suit against the debtor, Dixie Splint Coal Company
(Dixie Splint), and its dominant stockholder, Litton, for an accounting ofroyalties due to Pepper
under a lease. Id. at 297. While the suit was pending, Litton caused Dixie Splint to confess to
ajudgment for Litton of over $33,000 for alleged accumulated salary claims dating back five
years. Id Litton then formed a new company, Dixie Beaver Coal Company, by transferring
over all the property of Dixie Splint to the new company. Id. at 298. After the transfer of
property, Dixie Splint filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Id The Court found that this
entire scheme was "plainly for the sole purpose of avoiding payment of the Pepper debt." Id.
The Court reasoned that the fact that a dominant stockholder had reduced a claim to judgment
did not guarantee that the bankruptcy court had to treat the claims equally to the claims of other
creditors. Id. at 306. The Court stated that bankruptcy courts have the power to sift through
the circumstances of a claim to ensure the fair administration of the bankrupt estate. Id at 308.
The Court concluded that Litton used his position as an insider to gain an advantage for himself
and to the detriment of Pepper. Id, at 3 11. Consequently, the Pepper Court disallowed Litton's
claim. Id. at312.
42. See id. at 308-12 (suggesting that courts do not necessarily need to find fraud,
domination by shareholder, or undercapitalization of company to equitably subordinate claim);
Jeremy W. Dickens, Note, Equitable Subordination and Analogous Theories of Lender
Liability: Toward a New Model of"Control," 65 TEX. L. REv. 801, 812 (1987) (discussing
Pepper as it relates to origins of equitable subordination).
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sufficient to justify equitable subordination. 43 Less than ten years later, the
Supreme Court narrowed the use of equitable subordination by imposing a
requirement that bankruptcy courts find inequitable creditor conduct accom-
panied by bad faith before applying the doctrine.' Although courts struggled
for years without clear guidelines for how to apply equitable subordination,
virtually every court required a finding of inequitable creditor conduct before
ordering the subordination of a claim.45
B. The Mobile Steel Decision
In 1977, the Fifth Circuit in Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel
Co.)' finally organized the requirements for equitable subordination of claims
into a workable three-part test 7 In Mobile Steel, the court concluded that a
43. Pepper, 308 U.S. at 311.
44. See Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211,229 (1948) (distin-
guishing claim from Pepper based on creditor acting in good faith so that court should not
subordinate claim); see also DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 428 (commenting that Com-
stock is reminder to bankruptcy court that although it is court of equity, it cannot reclassify valid
claim that innocent party asserted in good faith just because court perceives result to be
inequitable).
45. See supra note 29 (listing decisions requiring inequitable conduct by creditor to
subordinate claim). But see Jezarian v. Raichle (In re Stirling Homex Corp.), 579 F.2d 206,
214-15 (2d Cir. 1978) (stating that court permitted subordination without explicit finding of
inequitable conduct), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1074 (1979). Butsee also Burden v. United States
(In re Burden), 917 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that opinions written in 1990 found
Stirling Homex to be only pre-1978 case allowing equitable subordination without finding
inequitable conduct by creditor).
46. 563 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1977).
47. Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 700 (5th Cir. 1977)
(holding that equitable considerations justify only subordination of claims, not their disallow-
ance, and that three conditions must be satisfied before equitable subordination is appropriate).
In Mobile Steel, the Fifth Circuit considered whether the bankruptcy court should subordinate
claims of some organizers, officers, and directors of the debtor because of mismanagement of
corporate affairs and unfair dealings between the corporation and its creditors. Id. at 695. The
trustee contended that debentures and promissory notes given to the claimants were actually pre-
ferred stock and were not entitled to debt treatment. Id. at 702. The court observed that
$250,000 of capital was initially contributed to Mobile Steel, and it concluded that the corpora-
tion was never undercapitalized. Id. at 703. The court also determined that the fiduciaries of
the company did not mismanage or breach their duties in connection with certain property
purchases. Id. at 704. The court found that the purchases of property were tax-driven and
actually benefitted the bankrupt. Id. at 705. Moreover, the court found that the purchases
proved detrimental to the financial interests of the fiduciaries themselves. Id. The court also
emphasized that the fiduciaries did not use Mobile Steel as a shell company and that it was
clearly a legitimate business, selling approximately $3.8 million worth of steel a year. Id. at
706. The Mobile Steel court stated that for equitable subordination of claims to be appropriate,
the trustee must satisfy three criteria. Id. at 699-700. First, the claimant must have engaged in
some type of inequitable conduct. Id. Second, the misconduct must have resulted in injuries
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claimant must satisfy the following three criteria to warrant the exercise of
equitable subordination: (1) the claimant must have engaged in some type
of inequitable conduct, (2) the misconduct must have caused injury to credi-
tors of the bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant, and
(3) equitable subordination of the claim must not be inconsistent with the
Bankruptcy Act provisions.48 A majority of courts adopted the Mobile Steel
test as a solution to the confusion of when to equitably subordinate claims in
bankruptcy. 49 The Supreme Court recognized and endorsed the Mobile Steel
three-part test for equitable subordination in 1996.50
The Mobile Steel court also noted that courts must consider three addi-
tional principles to implement equitable subordination properly.5 First, the
inequitable conduct and the claim at issue do not need to be related to warrant
subordination.5 2 The inequitable conduct may arise out of any unfair act by
the creditor so long as the conduct affects the bankruptcy results of the other
creditors.53 Second, courts should limit subordination of claims to the extent
required to offset the harm caused to the bankrupt and to the other creditors.54
This principle is a reminder to bankruptcy courts that their subordination
power derives from equitable principles and is remedial rather than penal.55
to other creditors or must have conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant Id. Finally,
equitable subordination must not have been inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Act. Id. The
court held that the first requirement of the test was not met because the fiduciaries did not
engage in inequitable conduct sufficient to subordinate the fiduciaries' claims. Id. at 706.
48. Id. at 699-700.
49. See, e.g., Stoumbus v. Kilimnik, 988 F.2d 949, 958 (9th Cir. 1993) (requiring
evidence of inequitable conduct by lender to equitably subordinate claim); Smith v. Associated
Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.), 893 F.2d 693, 699 (5th Cir. 1990) (same);
Estes v. N & D Properties, Inc. (In re N & D Properties, Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731 (1 lth Cir.
1986) (adopting Mobile Steel three-prong test); Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express,
Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 116 (9th
Cir. B.A.P. 1986) (applying Mobile Steel three-part test); In re Bell & Beckwith, 44 B.R. 664,
666 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (same); Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics
Servs., Inc.), 29 B.R. 139, 168 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (same).
50. See United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524, 1526 (1996) (noting that district courts
and courts of appeals generally follow Mobile Steel three-part test in applying § 510(c) to
equitably subordinate claims in bankruptcy proceedings).
51. SeeMobileSteel, 563 F.2d at 700 (listing three principles trustee must consider before
using equitable subordination); see also Wilson v. Huffinan (In re Missionary Baptist Found.
of Am.), 818 F.2d 1135, 1143-44 (5thCir. 1987) (citingMobile Steelfor proposition that court
must consider three additional principles when determining whether bankruptcy trustee satisfies
three criteria for equitable subordination).
52. Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 700.
53. See id. (citing Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Joumal-Post Co.), 144 F.2d 791,
803-04 (8th Cir. 1944)).
54. Id. at701.
55. Id.
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The third principal courts must consider is the allocation of the burden of
proof in equitable subordination cases and the notion that transactions involv-
ing fiduciaries or insiders of the bankrupt are subject to rigorous scrutiny.56
The party seeking the remedy of equitable subordination has the burden of
proof.5 7 The objection to the claim must include a factual basis to support the
allegations of unfair conduct. 8 If the trustee demonstrates a sufficient basis
for the objection, the burden shifts to the challenged creditor to show good
faith and fairness. 59 If the claimant engaging in inequitable conduct is an
insider60 or a fiduciary, the claim is subject to rigorous scrutiny, and the court
may subordinate the claim for less severe misconduct.61
Scholars generally regard the first part of the three-prong Mobile Steel
test, identifying inequitable conduct, as the most difficult to apply.62 The
Mobile Steel court enumerated the following three separate allegations of
inequitable conduct that justify equitable subordination: (1) undercapitali-
zation; (2) fraud, mismanagement, or breach of fiduciary duty; and (3) the




59. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) (stating that fiduciaries have burden
to demonstrate good faith and fairness from viewpoint of corporation and other interested
parties).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(B)(1998). The Code defines an insider ifdebtoris acorporation
as follows:
(31) "insider" includes-
(B) if the debtor is a corporation-
(i) director of the debtor,
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control
of the debtor.
Id.
61. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306 (noting that fiduciaries' dealings with corporation are
subject to rigorous scrutiny); Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,
701-02 (5th Cir. 1977) (observing that fiduciaries' claims demand close scrutiny); Anaconda-
Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 29 B.R. 139, 169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y.
1983) (stating that when claimant is insider, dealings with debtor "will be subjected to more
exacting scrutiny").
62. See DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 423 (stating that no precise definition is
possible for type of conduct necessary to be considered fraudulent or inequitable).
63. See Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 702 (noting that for purpose of court's analysis, alleged
misconduct could be divided into three classes).
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three examples of inequitable conduct are the grounds that debtors or credi-
tors' committees most often assert for equitable subordination.'
The first ground of alleged misconduct that the Mobile Steel court exam-
ined was undercapitalization.6s When capital contributions are insufficient,
courts consider a debtor undercapitalized.' Courts subordinate claims based
on undercapitalization when a claimant who exercises control over the debtor
funds the corporation through loans rather than through capital investment,
resulting in harm to the corporation and other creditors.67 Although courts
have never clearly defined the concept of undercapitalization, they often cite
two guidelines from Mobile Steel.68 First, the Mobile Steel court determined
that the moving party can establish inadequate capitalization if, in the opinion
of a financial analyst, the shareholders contributed an insufficient amount of
capital at the debtor's inception to support a debtor of that size and that
nature.69 Second, the court stated that capitalization is inadequate if, at the
time of the advances, the debtor could not borrow similar funds from an
informed outside source.7" A majority of courts support the proposition that
64. See Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d
1458, 1467 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that it is difficult to define boundaries of inequitable
conduct under first prong of Mobile Steel, but that three general categories of conduct constitute
inequitable conduct); Smith v. Associates Commercial Corp. (In re Clark Pipe & Supply Co.),
893 F.2d 693, 699 (5th Cir. 1990) (stating that courts recognize three general categories of
conduct sufficient to satisfy first prong of Mobile Steel test); Wilson v. Huffman (In re Mission-
ary Baptist Found. of Am.), 712 F.2d 206, 212 (5th Cir. 1983) (listing three categories of
conduct sufficient to warrant equitable subordination); In re Beverages Int'l Ltd., 50 B.R. 273,
281 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1985) (same); Waslow v. MNC Commercial Corp. (In re M. Paolella &
Sons, Inc.), 161 B.R. 107, 117-18 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (listing three situations in which
courts normally apply equitable subordination). But see United States Abatement Corp. v.
Mobil Exploration & Producing U.S., Inc. (In re United States Abatement Corp.), 39 F.3d 556,
561 (5th Cir. 1994) (confining equitable subordination to three alternative paradigms: (1) when
fiduciary of debtor misuses position to disadvantage of other creditors; (2) when third party
controls debtor to disadvantage of other creditors; and (3) when third party actually defrauds
other creditors); Holt v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. (In re CTS Truss, Inc.), 868 F.2d 146, 148-
49 (5th Cir. 1989) (same).
65. Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 702.
66. See Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d
128, 131 (5th Cir. 1993) (considering when corporation should be deemed undercapitalized).
67. See 4 KINGETAL., supra note 2, 510.05, at 510-23 (discussing undercapitalization
as example of inequitable conduct occurring when debt funding is substituted for risk capital).
68. See Herby's, 2 F.3 d at 131-32 (citing Mobile Steel for guidelines to establish if debtor
corporation is undercapitalized); Machinery Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiplonics, Inc.),
622 F.2d 709, 717 (5th Cir. 1980) (same).
69. See Benjaminv. Diamond (Inre Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,703 (SthCir. 1977)
(discussing questions to ask in determining whether debtor corporation is inadequately capital-
ized).
70. Id.
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initial undercapitalization alone is not enough to subordinate claims, and they
require some type of misconduct accompanying the undercapitalization.
7' If
courts subordinated claims solely based on the debtor's undercapitalization,
insiders would be reluctant to lend money to a struggling debtor.' This would
be devastating for debtors because insiders are normally the only persons
interested enough in a company to lend it money in troubled times.'
A second ground for equitable subordination of claims that the Mobile
Steel court examined was fraud, mismanagement, or breach of fiduciary
duties. 4 In order to equitably subordinate a claim based on fraud or breach
of fiduciary duties, the bankruptcy court need not find actual fraud.75 Because
fraudulent conduct cases often include elements ofundercapitalization or self-
dealing, it is difficult to place subordination cases in precise categories.76
Examples of fraudulent conduct demanding subordination of claims include
when a creditor knowingly makes false statements regarding the bankrupt's
financial condition and when a creditor colludes with the bankrupt, using its
claim to defraud other creditors.7 Although no clear line exists as to what
71. See Wood v. Richmond (In re Branding Iron Steak House), 536 F.2d 299,302 (9th
Cir. 1976) (requiring proof of inequitable conduct beyond mere initial undercapitalization);
Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 1958) (subordinating claim because trustee
showed more than mere undercapitalization); Rego Crescent Corp. v. Tymon (In re Rego
Crescent Corp.), 23 B.L 958, 962-65 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating that conduct of insider
or lender must be inequitable in addition to undercapitalization at time of loan).
72. See Braas Sys., Inc. v. WMR Partners (In re Octagon Roofing), 157 B.R. 852, 858
(N.D. Ill. 1993) (noting that absent inequitable conduct requirement, subordination of claims
would discourage loans from insiders to companies in financial difficulty).
73. See Allied E. States Maintenance Corp. v. Miller (In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc.), 911
F.2d 1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) (noting that insiders' strong interest in company and not
desire to protect themselves in bankruptcy-motivated attempts to salvage struggling company);
Octagon Roofing, 157 B.R. at 858 (noting that shareholders are most likely party to be moti-
vated to attempt to save struggling corporation on verge of bankruptcy).
74. See MobileSteel, 563 F.2d at 704 (determining whether claimants' breach of fiduciary
duties was sufficient to warrant equitable subordination of their claims).
75. See Heiser v. Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726, 732-33 (1946) (establishing that application
of equitable subordination does not require showing of actual fraud); Machinery Rental, Inc.
v. Herpel (In re Multiplonics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709, 720 (5th Cir. 1980) (rejecting claimant's
argument that he may have been foolish but not fraudulent); Costello, 256 F.2d at 910 (estab-
lishing that application of equitable subordination does not require showing of actual fraud).
76. See Asa S. Herzog & Joel B. Zweibel, The Equitable Subordination of Claims in
Bankruptcy, 15 VAND. L.REv. 83,99(1961) (discussingwhatconstitutes fraudulent inequitable
conduct sufficient to warrant equitable subordination of claim); Dickens, supra note 42, at 812
(discussing requirement of inequitable conduct for subordination and how courts interpret it).
77. See Bank of New Richmond v. Production Credit Assoc. (In re Osborne), 42 B.R.
988, 1000 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (concluding that claimant's misrepresentations deceived
and injured other creditors); FirstNat'l Bank v. Charles Blalock & Sons, Inc. (In re Just For the
Fun of It Tenn., Inc.), 7 B.R. 166, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (holding that claimant's
conduct in filing notice of completion and later repudiating that notice materially damaged other
700
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courts consider fraudulent conduct worthy of equitable subordination, suffi-
cient warning flags notify claimants that their conduct may result in subordi-
nation of their claims.
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The final ground of inequitable conduct that Mobile Steel acknowledged
was the claimant's use of the debtor corporation as a mere instrumentality or
alter ego. 9 It is clear that domination and control accompanied by fraud will
lead courts to disregard the corporate entity and equitably subordinate a
claim." Alter ego cases typically involve a debtor that is an affiliate of a
parent creditor."' If the debtor corporation is a mere instrumentality of the
creditor and the creditor's conduct prejudices other claimants, courts can
subordinate the creditor's claim to the injured claimants. 2 Courts will not
subordinate claims solely because of a parent or insider relationship; addi-
tional contributing factors must be present.8 3
The second prong of the Mobile Steel three-part test for exercising
subordination is whether the claimant's conduct injured other creditors of the
bankrupt or conferred an unfair advantage on the claimant." Inequitable
conduct alone does not justify equitable subordination unless the conduct
creditors and permitted subordination of claim); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 98-100
(discussing fraud classification of cases calling for equitable subordination).
78. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 100 (noting warning flags including mis-
representation of credit status, misuse ofjudgment claims, concealment, and overt misrepresen-
tation).
79. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 706 (5th Cir. 1977)
(discussing whether Mobile Steel was legitimate business instrumentality or shell corporation);
see also 4 KING ET AL., supra note 2, 510.05, at 510-19 (discussing cases of equitable
subordination in which claimant is insider or alter ego of bankrupt debtor).
80. See Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306 U.S. 307, 323 (1939) (deciding to
subordinate parent company's claim because parent's abuses in management and control led to
debtor's bankruptcy); Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 104 (discussing alter ego and
instrumentality category of cases in which courts have implemented equitable subordination).
81. See Comstock v. Group of Institutional Investors, 335 U.S. 211,229 (1948) (noting
that courts will not allow fiduciary that dominates subsidiary to benefit by breaching its trust);
Taylor, 306 U.S. at 323 (observing that abuses in management because of interest of Standard
as proprietor and creditor of subsidiary led to bankruptcy of Deep Rock corporation); 4 KING
ETAL., supra note 2, 510.05, at 510-19.
82. See Comstock 335 U.S. at 229 (noting that creditors' use of opportunity to do wrong
that injures other creditors will result in subordination of claim); In re Process-Manz Press, Inc.,
236 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Ill. 1964) (subordinating claim to other unsecured creditors because
claimant voted debtor's stock to detriment of other creditors).
83. See Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 701 (noting that nature of relation between bankrupt
debtor and claimant does not invalidate claims advanced by fiduciary claimants); Woodv. Rich-
mond (In re Branding Iron SteakHouse), 536 F.2d299, 302 (9thCir. 1976) (stating thatforcourt
to subordinate claim, some type of inequitable conduct must accompany close relationship).
84. See Mobile Steel, 563 F.2d at 700 (discussing second prong of test to exercise
equitable subordination).
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results in harm to other creditors.8" The court must contemplate the harm
done to future creditors as well as to present creditors of the bankrupt party.1
6
The court's primary consideration is whether the inequitable conduct affected
the bankruptcy proceedings.8 7 The misconduct affects the proceedings when
creditors lose something they had an equitable or legal right to receive in
bankruptcy.88 Demonstratingthatthe inequitable conduct reducedthe chances
of general creditors to collect their debts is adequate to satisfy the second
prong of the Mobile Steel test. 9 The bankruptcy courts can remedy creditor
misconduct by subordinating the offending creditor's claim below those credi-
tors harmed by the inequitable conduct.9
The third prong of the Mobile Steel test is that equitable subordination
of the claim must not be inconsistent with provisions of bankruptcy law.9'
This element of the test is a reminder to bankruptcy courts that they cannot
adjust valid claims by good faith creditors simply because the courts sense an
inequitable result.' One court stated that the enactment of § 5 1 0(c) rendered
this prong of the test useless because now the Code clearly recognizes the
85. See Comstock 335 U.S. at 229 (discussing requirement that creditor benefit itself at
detriment of subsidiary for court to subordinate claim); Branding Iron Steak House, 536 F.2d
at 302 (refusing to subordinate claim because no exercise of control to detriment of creditors).
86. See Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903,911 (9th Cir. 1958) (finding inequitable conduct
to detriment of present or future creditors sufficient to subordinate claim); DeNatale & Abram,
supra note 2, at 426 (discussing requirements for satisfying second prong of Mobile Steel test
for subordination of claims).
87. See DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 426 (noting court's considerations in
determining whether claimant's behavior warrants equitable subordination).
88. See Bostian v. Schapiro (In re Kansas City Journal-Post Co.), 144 F.2d 791, 800-01
(8th Cir. 1944) (noting that subordination should not punitively take away one creditor's
justified claim and give it to someone with no fair right to claim); DeNatale & Abram, supra
note 2, at 426 (observing that particular facts of individual case are important to determine
extent of harm to creditors resulting from inequitable conduct).
89. See Creditor's Comm. of Trantex Corp. v. Baybank Valley Trust Co. (In re Trantex
Corp.), 10 B.R. 235, 238 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1981) (characterizing harm as reasonable likelihood
of creditors collecting debt and whether wrongdoing claimant's actions reduced chances of
collecting from debtor).
90. See L & M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 668, 671-72 (4th Cir. 1957) (noting that
claim is subordinated only to claims of creditors who were injured by inequitable dealings);
First Nat'l Bank v. Charles Blalock& Sons, Inc. (In re Just For the Fun of It Tenn., Inc.), 7 B.R.
166, 181 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980) (subordinating claim below creditors harmed by inequitable
conduct, but not below those creditors whose claims inequitable dealings did not affect);
DeNatale & Abram, supra note 2, at 426 (noting that court can subordinate claims to creditors
actually injured by inequitable conduct).
91. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,700(5th Cir. 1977)
(noting third prong of test for equitably subordinating claims).
92. See Stebbins v. Crocker Citizens Nat'l Bank (In re Ashwede), 516 F.2d 784, 787 (9th
Cir. 1975) (noting that bankruptcy court's power to impose result different from one intended
by law is not unlimited simply because court perceives result unjust).
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court's authority to equitably subordinate claims in bankruptcy. 3 Another
court interpreted the third prong to mean that bankruptcy courts cannot
recharacterize debt transactions as equity.94 This difference of opinion has led
some bankruptcy courts to recharacterize claims that other courts refuse to
equitably subordinate.95
C. Congress Codifies Equitable Subordination
In 1978, Congress codified the judicially created doctrine of equitable
subordination in § 510(c) of the current Code. s This section grants bank-
ruptcy courts the authority to subordinate normally allowable claims to other
claims with equal standing according to principles of equity.97 Congress
purposely drafted § 510(c) very broadly to allow bankruptcy courts to follow
existing case law such as Mobile Steel." Furthermore, Congress noted that
bankruptcy courts should subordinate claims only if the claimant engaged in
some type of inequitable conduct.9 The bankruptcy courts ordinarily consider
whether creditor misconduct harmed other creditors of the debtor."° If the
misconduct harmed other creditors, the creditor at fault must wait until the
estate first satisfies the claims of those that the creditor harmed.'
Bankruptcy courts still generally apply the three-part test from Mobile
Steel to determine whether to equitably subordinate a claim."0 2 If the claim-
93. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 628 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (citing
three-part test from Mobile Steel for requirements to subordinate claim and noting that imple-
mentation of Code § 5 10(c) makes third part of test irrelevant).
94. See Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that bankruptcy court is not authorized to recharacterize transactions because it results in
subordination of claims that § 5 10(c) governs).
95. See infra Part IV (comparing different circuit opinions regarding ability ofbankruptcy
courts to recharacterize creditors' claims even though circumstances do not warrant equitable
subordination of claims).
96. See supra note 6 (reproducing text of 1I U.S.C. § 5 10(oc) (1994)).
97. See 4 KING ET AL., supra note 2, 510.02, at 510-14 (discussing subordination of
claims).
98. 124 CONG. REc. 32,398 (statementofRep. Edwards), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6542; 124 CoNG. REc. 33,998 (statement of Sen. DeConcini), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6521.
99. 124 CONG.REC. 32,398 (statementofRep. Edwards),reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 6542. Congress also noted that claims of a status susceptible to subordination, such as
penalties and damage claims involving securities, can be subordinated without finding inequita-
ble conduct. Id This Note addresses ordinary debt transactions and does not analyze claims
of a status susceptible to subordination.
100. 4 KINGETAL., supra note 2, 510.02, at 510-15.
101. Id.
102. See Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692,699-700 (5th Cir.
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ant engaging in inequitable conduct is an insider or a fiduciary, a court may
subordinate the claim for less severe misconduct.°3 The objecting party bears
the burden of presenting material evidence of unfair conduct by the insider
creditor.104 Once the objecting party meets this burden, the claimant must
prove both the fairness and the ann's length nature of the questioned transac-
tions or the court will subordinate the insider's claims. 105
Equitable subordination generally requires some type of inequitable
conduct on the part of a creditor." n A few recent decisions have departed
from this requirement and have subordinated claims without finding inequi-
table conduct.0 7 These decisions seem to indicate a desire by at least
some courts to establish an increased level of lender liability."0 ' Although
the Supreme Court has not decided whether inequitable conduct is an abso-
lute prerequisite to subordination under § 510(c),11 the majority of courts
continue to require inequitable conduct by creditors before subordinating
claims." 0
The burden of proving the existence of all the elements required for
equitable subordination is on the objecting party."' The objecting party must
1977) (stating that equitable subordination is extraordinary remedy that requires satisfaction of
certain conditions before court can exercise power); supra notes 46-95 and accompanying text
(discussing Mobile Steel).
103. See Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 29 B.R. 139,
169 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that when claimant is insider, dealings with debtor "will
be subjected to more exacting scrutiny").
104. See Estes v. N & D Properties, Inc. (In re N & D Properties, Inc.), 799 F.2d 726, 731
(I th Cir. 1986) (discussing burden of proof in equitable subordination cases); Teltronics, 29
B.R. at 169 (discussing burden on objecting party to come forward with sufficient evidence of
misconduct by insider claimant).
105. See Teltronics,29B.R. at 169 (discussing equitable subordination ofinsider's claims).
106. See Machinery Rental, Inc. v. Herpel (In re Multiplonics, Inc.), 622 F.2d 709, 713
(5th Cir. 1980) (adopting Mobile Steel three-part test to implement equitable subordination,
including first part that requires that claimant have engaged in inequitable conduct); supra note
61 (listing cases relying on inequitable conduct to equitably subordinate claims in bankruptcy
proceedings).
107. See generally Schultz Broadway Inn v. United States, 912 F.2d 230 (8th Cir. 1990);
In re Virtual Network Servs. Corp., 902 F.2d 1246 (7th Cir. 1990).
108. See Scott M. Browning, Note, No Fault Equitable Subordination: Reassuring Inves-
tors That Only Government Penalty Claims.Are At Risk 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487,522-23
(1993) (discussing courts' motivations for applying equitable subordination to claims absent
any inequitable conduct).
109. See generally United States v. Noland, 116 S. Ct. 1524 (1996) (declining to address
whether inequitable conduct is prerequisite to implementing § 510(c) of Bankruptcy Code to
equitably subordinate claims in bankruptcy proceedings).
110. See supra note 49 (listing decisions adopting Mobile Steel three-part test requiring
inequitable conduct).
111. See Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc. v. Hessen (In re Teltronics Servs., Inc.), 29 B.R. 139,
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demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant engaged in
inequitable conduct which hurt other creditors and that warrants subordina-
tion.112 The goal of equitable subordination is to put creditors in the places in
the payment line that they would have occupied if not for the inequitable
conduct.113 As a result, the remedy of subordination only rectifies injury that
the claimant's inequitable conduct created." 4 Therefore, the moving party
must be able to show the extent of the damage that the inequitable conduct
caused for the creditor."5 Although equitable subordination is still a broad
doctrine in its application, the Mobile Steel framework and its codification in
§ 510(c) enable bankruptcy courts to implement the doctrine with some sense
of uniformity and predictability." 6
III Recharacterization of Claims
One exceptionally confusing device currently employed by a majority of
bankruptcy courts is the recharacterization of debt transactions into equity
contributions. 7 Courts ordinarily consider whether to recharacterize atrans-
action after the trustee in bankruptcy first objects to the creditor's claim." 8
This situation most often occurs when shareholders advance money to a
corporation."19 Specifically, after the owners initially organize the corporation
168 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983) (noting thatburden of proving all elements of equitable subordina-
tion is on objecting party).
112. Id. at 103-04.
113. Id at 103.
114. Id
115. Id
116. See Browning, supra note 108, at 522-23 (noting that courts have sufficient options
under Mobile Steel framework without resorting to inconsistent, unpredictablejurisprudence).
117. See Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d
128, 133 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that court is authorized to recharacterize loans as equity
contributions even when circumstances do not warrant equitable subordination); G.J. Sinclair
v. Barr (In re Mid-Town Produce Terminal, Inc.), 599 F.2d 389, 393 (10th Cir. 1979) (noting
that usual procedure in bankruptcy proceeding is to first determine whether transaction is loan
or capital contribution); United States v. Colorado Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D.
Colo. 1995) (discussing bankruptcy court's power to recharacterize purported loans as contribu-
tions to capital); Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R 555, 561-62 (Bankr.
D.RI. 1993) (considering recharacterization of alleged loans as equity capital); Diasonics, Inc.
v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that court should determine
whether transaction is loan or capital contribution before determining equitable subordination
issue). Butsee In re Lewiston Steam & Power Assocs., No. B86-00477-Y, 1989 Bankr. LEXIS
1382, at * 12 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 1989) (referring to recharacterization of advances as
capital contributions as minority concept).
118. See Jules S. Cohen, ShareholderAdvances: Capital orLoans, 52 AM.BANKR.L.J. 259,
259 (1978) (discussing results of recharacterizing debt transactions into capital contributions).
119. Id.
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with capital contributions, the shareholders occasionally advance additional
funds to the corporation in the form of loans.20 The trustee sometimes argues
thatthese additional advances are actually capital contributions.' The trustee
contends that no actual debt exists and, therefore, the court should disallow
the claim.'1 The result achieved by recharacterizing the transaction is essen-
tially subordination of the claim." The court's action subordinates the
recharacterized claim in bankruptcy below the debtor's unsecured creditors
to the level of equity holders. 24 A claim recharacterized as an equity transac-
tion is not satisfied until the estate pays all other creditors in full."z The
bankruptcy trustee rarely pays equity holders because the estate normally has
insufficient property to satisfy the unsecured creditors' claims. 26
Many courts base their authority to recharacterize a transaction in bank-
ruptcy on Pepper v. Litton,'27 which scholars generally regard as an equitable




123. See Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d
128, 133 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that in Herby's Foods, practical effects of recharacterization
and equitable subordination were identical); Central Coops., Inc. v. Irwin (In re Colonial
Poultry Farms), 177 B.R. 291, 299 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (explaining that end result of
equitable subordination and recharacterization are similar); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R.
626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that effects ofrecharacterizing and equitably subordi-
nating claim are same).
124. See Cohen, supra note 118, at 259 (citing dictum from Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 309-10 (1939)) (stating that court can subordinate advances by controlling stockholders
to other claims, and court can treat them as capital contributions in certain cases); see also Dia-
sonics, 121 B.R., at 630 (stating that trustee pays recharacterized claims and equitably subordi-
nated claims after trustee pays all other creditors).
125. Diasonics, 121 B.R at 630.
126. See JORDAN & WARREN, supra note 3, at 30 (discussing distribution of assets to
unsecured creditors).
127. 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
128. See Cohen, supra note 118, at 259-60 (citing dictum from Pepper v. Litton that court
may treat shareholder's loan claim as equity investment and disallow it); see also supra notes
40-43 and accompanying text (discussing Pepper v. Litton as equitable subordination case, not
example ofrecharacterization). In Pepper, the Court subordinated the stockholder's claim on
equitable principles to prevent injustice. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 312 (1939). The
Supreme Court narrowed the grounds for applying equitable subordination afterPepper in Corn-
stocky. Group ofInstitutionalInvestors. See Comstockv. Group of Institutional Investors, 335
U.S. 211, 229 (1948) (stating that courts need more than just mere existence of opportunity to
do wrong for equitable subordination). In Comstock, the Court required that bankruptcy courts
find bad faith by the creditor in order to apply equitable subordination. See supra notes 28, 44
and accompanying text (discussing Comstock); see also Diasonics, 121 B.R at 631 (citing
Pepper as first bankruptcy case examining substance of transaction rather than just form of
transaction).
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holder's claim in Pepper as a capital investment.' 29 Rather, the Court disal-
lowed the shareholder's claim on equitable grounds to prevent injustice.130
The Court only mentioned the concept of recharacterizing loans as capital
contributions as dicta in the opinion.' In 1948, the Court took a step back
from Pepper by requiring bad faith of the creditor to subordinate a claim.
32
Courts continue to recharacterize debt claims to equity even without satisfying
the criteria for equitable subordination.' Courts justify recharacterizing
claims by pointing to the authority vested in the bankruptcy court to use its
equitable powers to test the validity of debts.'
No clear test exists for determining whether a court should recharacterize
a transaction. 3' The Code does not provide any specific authorization for
courts to recharacterize debt into equity transactions. 36 Courts often rely on
§ 105 of the Code, which refers to the general equitable powers of the court.'37
Courts point to the authority of bankruptcy courts to disregard the form of a
transaction to determine its true substance. 3 The lack of a specific code
129. SeePepper,308U.S. at307-08 (explainingcourt'sauthorityto exerciseequitablejuris-
diction when allowing claim would unfairly benefit stockholder to detriment of other creditors).
130. Id.
131. See id. at 309-10 (listing situations in which disallowance or subordination of claims
is warranted).
132. See supra note 128 (discussing narrower application of equitable subordination given
by Court in Comstock, which required bad faith by creditor to warrant subordination of claim).
133. See Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d
128, 133 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that court is authorized to recharacterize loans as equity
contributions even when circumstances do not warrant equitable subordination); In re Blevins
Concession Supply Co., 213 B.R. 185, 187 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (stating that when share-
holder substitutes debt for adequate risk capital, courts should recharacterize claim as equity
even if trustee cannot meet other requirements of equitable subordination); Diasonics, Inc. v.
Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that substitution of debt for
adequate risk capital alone warrants reclassification of alleged loan to equity). Butsee Blasbalg
v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 561-62 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993) (rejecting
trustee's contention that mere undercapitalization justifies recharacterization of transaction).
134. See In re Cold Harbor Assoc., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997)
(discussing court's ability to inquire into nature of transaction and recharacterize it using
equitable powers if necessary); Fett v. Moore (In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc.), 438
F. Supp. 726, 729-30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1977) (stating that bankruptcy court, as court of equity,
can disregard appearance of transaction and determine its actual character).
135. See infra note 143 (discussing various factors courts examine to determine if court
should recharacterize claim from debt to equity).
136. See supra note 6 (reproducing § 5 10(c), which authorizes equitable subordination of
claims). No Code section explicitly authorizes bankruptcy courts to recharacterize debt trans-
actions into equity.
137. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (discussing bankruptcy court's reliance on
§ 105 for general equitable powers).
138. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939) (stating that bankruptcy court's
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provision governing recharacterization of claims leaves courts with a large
number of factors to consider when determining whether to recharacterize a
transaction. 3 9
Courts generally focus on several different criteria to determine if they
should characterize a claim as a loan or equity transaction.14' The courts'
primary consideration appears to be whether the transaction reflects the
characteristics of an arm's length negotiation.'14  Courts are more likely to
characterize a transaction made at arm's length as a loan. 42 They use a
variety of factors to determine whether a claimant made a transaction at arm's
length. 43 The factors for courts to consider encompass the following three
equitable powers enable it to look past form of transaction to its substance in determining
whether to treat transaction as debt or equity).
139. See infra note 143 (listing factors courts consider in determining whether to subordi-
nate transactions).
140. See Central Coops., Inc. v. Irwin (In re Colonial Poultry Farms), 177 B.R. 291,299
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) (discussing multitude of factors courts use to determine characteriza-
tion of claim); Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555, 561 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1993) (listing several factors considered for recharacterization including adequacy of
contributed capital, ratio of shareholder loans to capital, amount of shareholder control, and
availability of loans from outside lenders); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R 626,631 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that trustee must show that corporation was initially undercapitalized
or that no disinterested creditor would loan it money at time of transaction); Cohen, supra note
118, at 264 (discussing criteria for recharacterization of transaction from debt to equity).
141. See Pepper, 308 U.S. at 306-07 (noting that test to scrutinize dealings between
director or stockholder and debtor corporation is whether transaction is arm's length bargain);
In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997) (stating primary
factor to consider in determining whether advances were loans or capital contributions is
whether transaction bore earmarks of arm's length bargain); Cohen, supra note 118, at 264
(noting that most criteria in determining whetherto recharacterize transactions focus on whether
transaction resembles arm's length bargain).
142. Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at 915.
143. See Celotex Corp. v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings
Corp.), 176 B.R. 223, 248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (listing 13 factors courts should examine
when determining whether to recharacterize debt as equity). In Celotex, the court considered
the following list offactors: (1) the names given the instruments that evidence the indebtedness,
(2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date, (3) the source of the payments, (4) the right
to enforce payment of the principal and interest, (5) participation in management flowing as a
result of the transaction, (6) the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate
creditors, (7) the intent of the parties, (8) "thin" or inadequate capitalization, (9) identity of
interest between creditor and stockholder, (10) the source of interest payments, (11) the ability
of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions, (12) the extent to which the
corporation used the advance to acquire capital assets, and (13) the failure of the debtor to repay
on the due date or to seek postponement. Id.; see Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800
F.2d 625, 630-32 (6th Cir. 1986) (considering 11 similar factors to determine if advances were
loans or capital contributions); Lane v. United States (In re Lane), 742 F.2d 1311, 1314-15
(11 th Cir. 1984) (using same list of factors as Celotex court); Estate of Mixon v. United States,
464 F.2d 394,402 (5th Cir. 1972) (same); ColdHarbor, 204 B.R. at 915 (same); Cohen, supra
note 118, at 264 (discussing factors similar to those listed in Celotex).
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critical groups: (1) the formality of the alleged loan agreement, (2) the finan-
cial situation of the company when the creditor made the purported loan, and
(3) the relationship between the creditor and the debtor.'"
Courts measure the formality of the alleged loan by how specific and
complete the parties make the agreement. 14 The transaction appears more
like a loan when the parties clearly identify and codify the terms of the agree-
ment.146 Courts will often label the transaction a capital investment if the
terms of the agreement are vague and unspecific. 47 They examine the formal-
ity of the agreement by looking to the intent of the parties and at the names
given to the agreement documents. '4 The parties' labeling of the documents
normally demonstrates their intentions concerning the agreement. 49 Courts
also consider whether the creditor has the right to enforce payment of princi-
pal or interest. 5 ' Debt holders have the right to enforce payment by the
debtor under the terms of the agreement, while equity holders have no similar
right.' The absence ofa fixed maturity date, a schedule of interest payments,
and a sinking fund indicate that the agreement is actually a capital contribu-
tion.5 2 Lenders do not normally engage in debt transactions without clearly
establishing the maturity date and the schedule of payments for the loan.'
144. See Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at 916-18 (highlighting three main themes that mark




148. See United States v. Colorado Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1339,1342 (D. Colo. 1995)
(noting that one relevant factor used to determine whether court should recharacterize loan is
how parties treated transaction when made); Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.),
158 B.R. 555, 561 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1993) (including analysis of how business records treat debt
to determine treatment of disputed transaction).
149. See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting
issuance of stock certificate indicates equity contribution while issuance of bond, debenture, or
note indicates true indebtedness); Celotex Corp. v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hills-
borough Holdings Corp.), 176 B.R. 223,248 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (noting that labeling of
obligations as loans indicates intent to treat advances as debt). The parties' labeling of the
transaction serves as evidence of how to classify the deal, but the labels are not dispositive of
whether the transaction should be recharacterized. Id
150. Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1986). If the
debtor's repayment of a claimant's advances depends on the financial success of the debtor, the
transaction appears to be a capital contribution. Id.; Lane v. United States (In re Lane), 742
F.2d 1311, 1314 (11th Cir. 1984); In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 917 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 1997).
151. Cold Harbor, 204 B.R at 917.
152. Id. at917-18.
153. Roth Steel, 800 F.2d at 631; Lane, 742 F.2d at 1317. The creditor in Lane took none
of the common precautions to ensure payment in the event that the business went bankrupt
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Additionally, debtors often establish sinking funds to provide for repayment
of the loans. 54 Another factor indicating an equity transaction is the corpora-
tion's use of the advances to purchase capital equipment.'55 Corporations
normally use loan proceeds to meet the everyday expenses of the operation. 156
A final consideration in examining the formality of the alleged loan agree-
ment is the presence or absence of security.5 7 Lack of security for the credi-
tor indicates that the transaction was not made at arm's length and that it is
more likely a capital contribution than a loan.'58
The second group of factors that courts consider involves the financial
situation of the company at the time of the transaction.15 9 Inadequate capital-
ization indicates that courts should consider shareholders' initial loans as
capital contributions to the corporation. 60 A related issue to undercapitali-
zation is whether the corporation could obtain outside financing at the time
of the transaction.' Courts generally analyze the undercapitalization ques-
tion just as they would in the equitable subordination context.1 62 Courts look
to either the initial amount of capital in a corporation or the corporation's
capital at the time of the transaction. Courts also look to the amount of
indicating that he intended advances to constitute contributions of capital rather than debt. Id.;
Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at 917.
154. SeeRothSteel, 800F.2dat631 (stating that absence of security for advances is strong
indication of capital contribution).
155. See Celotex Corp. v. Hillsborough Holdings Corp. (In re Hillsborough Holdings
Corp.), 176 B.R. 223, 249 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994) (stating that corporation's use of advances
to purchase capital equipment may indicate advances were in fact capital contributions).
156. See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625,632 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating
that use of advances to meet daily operating expenses of corporation indicates that advances
were indeed loans).
157. Id.
158. Id; see In re Cold HarborAssocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 918 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997)
(noting that absence of security indicates advance is not loan, and complete lack of security is
evidence that parties did not transact business at arm's length).
159. Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at.916.
160. Id. at 917; see Braddy v. Randolph, 352 F.2d 80, 82 (4th Cir. 1965) (finding inade-
quate capitalization because bankrupt debtor began borrowing from officers and bank from
outset of operations); Fett v. Moore (In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc.), 438 F. Supp.
726, 730-31 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1977) (noting that corporation's debt-to-equity ratio of over
eighty to one cast serious doubts on advances truly being loans).
161. See Roth Steel, 800 F.2d at 631 (stating that question to ask is whether reasonable
outside creditor would loan debtor money in this situation on similar terms).
162. Seesupranotes68-70andaccompanyingtext(discussingMobileSteel'stwo questions
to determine if debtor corporation is undercapitalized in equitable subordination case); see also
United States v. Colorado Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1339,1343 (D. Colo. 1995) (adopting two-
part test for undercapitalization from Mobile Steel and applying it in context of recharacteri-
zation).
163. Colorado Invesco, 902 F. Supp. at 1342.
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control shareholders exercise and to whether the undercapitalization ulti-
mately caused the debtor's bankruptcy.'" Although undercapitalization alone
is insufficient to justify equitable subordination, 65 it is enough to recharac-
terize an alleged loan into a capital contribution.'"
The final group of factors that courts examine in determining whether to
recharacterize atransaction involves the relationship between the parties to the
agreement. 67 One factor evidencing a capital contribution is the right to
participate in management for the creditor as a result of the transaction. 6 Any
time a lender obtains the right to control the company's operations, the court
considers the transaction an equity contribution. 69 A final factor to consider
is the relationship between the creditor and the shareholder. 17 If all the share-
holders of a corporation advance money in proportion to their stock ownership,
the court will probably find that the contribution is an equity transaction.''
The transaction appears to be more like a loan, however, if one shareholder
advances money in disproportion to his interest in the corporation.
72
The courts should weigh the relevant factors as a group so that no single
factor will result in recharacterization of an advance. 7  The many different
164. See Blasbalgv.Tarro(Inre Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555,561 (Bankr.D.R.I.
1993) (noting that in considering whetherto recharacterize transaction, court considers whether
debtor's ultimate financial failure resulted from undercapitalization).
165. See Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d
1458, 1469 (5th Cir. 1991) (stating that "undercapitalization alone is an insufficient reason to
use equitable subordination" (quoting Wood v. Richmond (In re Branding Iron Steak House),
536 F.2d 299, 302 (9th Cir. 1976))); Braas Sys., Inc. v. WMRPartners (In re Octagon Roofing),
141 B.R. 968, 984 (N.D. I1. 1992) (stating that only when undercapitalization is combined with
inequitable conduct will courts subordinate insiders' claims).
166. See In re Blevins Concession Supply Co., 213 B.R. 185,187 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997)
(stating that when shareholder substitutes debt for adequate risk capital, court should recharac-
terize claim as equity even iftrustee cannot meet other requirements of equitable subordination).
But see Hyperion, 158 B.R. at 561-62 (rejecting trustee's contention that mere undercapitaliza-
tion justifies recharacterization of transaction).
167. In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 916 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
168. See Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394,406 (5th Cir. 1972) (noting that
when debtor grants creditor participation in management as result of advances, management
participation is evidence of capital contribution by creditor); Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at 917
(observing that one characteristic of equity contribution is participation in management).
169. Cold Harbor, 204 B.R. at 917.
170. Id. at919.
171. See Mixon, 464 F.2d at 409 (observing that one indication of equity contribution is
when stockholders advance money to corporation in proportion with their holdings); Cold
Harbor, 204 B.R. at 918-19 (noting that shareholders' loan to partnership on pro-rata basis
equal to interest in partnership indicated that shareholders made equity contribution).
172. See Mixon, 464 F.2d at 409 (noting that sharply disproportionate ratio between
interest in company and advance indicate true debt transaction).
173. See Central Coops., Inc. v. Irwin (In re Colonial Poultry Farms), 177 B.R. 291, 300
(Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995) ("[Njo one fact will result in the determination that putative loans are
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factors employed to determine if courts should treat an alleged loan as a
capital contribution make it difficult for both lenders and corporate borrowers
to predict how the court will view individual transactions. 174
IV Pacific Express: The Ninth Circuit's Reason for Disallowing the
Recharacterization of Claims in Bankruptcy
Although courts apply different tests to determine when they can
recharacterize a debt transaction into equity or equitably subordinate a claim,
the two procedures produce the same basic result.17 The court moves the
recharacterized or equitably subordinated claim behind other unsecured credi-
tors, and the estate pays the claimant only after the estate satisfies all other
obligations. 76 In Pacific Express, the B.A.P. held that the bankruptcy court
construed its authority too broadly by recharacterizing claims from debt to
equity.177 The panel rejected the adoption of tax court standards to determine
the true character of a disputed claim. 78 In effect, the B.A.P. ruled that a
court can subordinate a claim behind other claims only by using § 510(c)
equitable subordination.
179
Did the Pacific Express B.A.P. really intend for bankruptcy courts to
apply § 510(c) equitable subordination to subordinate advances that were
actually contributions to capital." (quoting Fettv. Moore (In re Fett Roofing & SheetMetal Co.,
Inc.), 436 F. Supp. 726, 731 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1977))).
174. See Cohen, supra note 118, at 274 (discussing court criteria for determining whether
to treat loans as capital contributions).
175. See Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (In re Herby's Foods, Inc.), 2 F.3d
128, 133 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that practical effects of recharacterization and equitable
subordination are identical); Colonial Poultry Farms, 177 B.R. at 299 (explaining that end
result of equitable subordination and recharacterization are similar).
176. See Colonial Poultry Farms, 177 B.R. at 299 (discussing result of recharacterizing
debt transaction into equity contribution); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr.
N.D. Fla. 1990) (stating that trustee pays recharacterized claims after paying other unsecured
creditors).
177. Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding
Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (holding that Code
does not support courts' ability to characterize claims as debt or equity).
178. See id. (claiming that although some sources approve use oftax standards, they should
be considered irrelevant to claim determination in bankruptcy proceedings); see also Long
Island Lighting Co. v. Bokum Resources Corp., 40 B.R. 274,296 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1983) (noting
that examination of claims in bankruptcy is for different purpose and utilizes different criteria
than analysis for tax purposes); Rego Crescent Corp. v. Tymon (In re Rego Crescent Corp.), 23
B.R. 958, 962 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that legal questions and policy considerations
for tax determination of claims is removed from determination of whether courts should
consider capital contributions or loans for bankruptcy purposes).
179. SeePacificExpress, 69B.1R at 115-16 (noting that appropriatetestto use in consider-
ing whether to subordinate claim is equitable subordination under § 510(c)).
RECHARACTERIZATIONAND EQUITABLE SUBORDINATION 713
actually capital contributions? The bankruptcy court's decision in Diasonics,
Inc. v. Ingalls 1° illustrates the result that the Pacific Express B.A.P. may have
intended to avoid by prohibiting bankruptcyjudges from using recharacteriza-
tion to subordinate claims."8' In Diasonics, an unsecured creditor, Diasonics,
Inc. (Diasonics) requested that the court either recharacterize the debt claims
of National Plastics (Plastics) and Ingalls as capital contributions or equitably
subordinate those claims to the other unsecured creditors' claims.18 2 Ingalls
owned and controlled Diasonics through Plastics, which existed solely to
receive funds from Ingalls and to distribute them to Diasonics." Ingalls
structured these advances as long-term debt and listed them as loans on his tax
returns. 8 4 The court denied Diasonics's motion for summary judgment
regarding equitable subordination of the claims, but it granted a motion for
summary judgment with respect to recharacterizing the claims as capital
contributions. 5 The court refused to equitably subordinate Ingalls's claims
because it found no evidence of inequitable conduct. 8 6 The court decided that
undercapitalization without additional inequitable conduct did not justify
equitable subordination. 1 7 Furthermore, the court stated that the appropriate
issue in determining if courts should subordinate claims because of under-
180. 121 B.R 626 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990).
181. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 632 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (holding
funds advanced to debtor by Ingalls to be capital contributions and not loans). In Diasonics,
the bankruptcy court considered whether advances made by Ingalls to Diasonics, Inc.
(Diasonics) should be equitably subordinated or, alternatively, treated as capital contributions
instead of as loans. Id. at 626-27. Over a period of several years, Ingalls advanced money to
Diasonics both personally and through a parent corporation of Diasonics. Id. at 627. Ingalls
structured the advances to Diasonics in the form of long-term loans. Id. The court found no
evidence of inequitable conduct by Ingalls sufficient to warrant exercising the power of§ 5 10(c)
equitable subordination. Ma at 630. The Diasonics court held that the initial undercapitaliza-
tion of a company, without additional inequitable conduct, is not a sufficient basis for equitably
subordinating a claim. Id. A court should not consider the issue of equitable subordination
until it determines whether the advances are loans or capital contributions. Id. If the court
determines thatthe advances are actually capital contributions, the equitable subordination issue
becomes completely irrelevant. Id. Once the court determines that the advances are capital
contributions, the court must subordinate the advances to true claims because capital contribu-
tions are repaid only after all other obligations are satisfied. Id The Diasonics court found no
evidence of initial undercapitalization ofDiasonics. Id at 63 1. The court, however, determined
that at the time Ingalls advanced funds to the debtor, no disinterested investor would provide
similar financing. Id at 632. Consequently, the Diasonics court held that the advances were
actually capital contributions to Diasonics and not loans. Id.
182. Id. at 626-27.
183. Id. at 627.
184. Id
185. Id
186. Id at 629.
187. Id.
56 WASH. & LEE L. REV 689 (1999)
capitalization is whether the advance is a loan or an equity contribution.'
The court also stated that when Ingalls advanced funds to the debtor, no other
disinterested lender would extend equivalent credit."8 9 Based on this determi-
nation, the court found the advances to be capital contributions rather than
loans.19°
Under the Pacific Express analysis, the court would reach a different
result in Diasonics.'9' The Diasonics court refused to equitably subordinate
the advances, but it accomplished the same result of subordination by rechar-
acterizing the claims as capital contributions." Pacific Express holds that
bankruptcy courts are not authorized to recharacterize advances, so once a
court denies equitable subordination as in Diasonics, the claims would remain
on a level with other secured creditors.' Although additional factors possi-
bly weighed against the characterization of the advances as loans in Dia-
sonics,194 the court based its decision to recharacterize the advances as capital
contributions on its determination that no other disinterested lenders would
extend credit.195 Allowing bankruptcy judges to recharacterize claims based
on mere undercapitalization alone or on the inability of a corporation to obtain
outside financing is a result that the Pacific Express decision clearly pro-
hibits. 96
188. Id.
189. Id. at 632.
190. Id.
191. See id. (holding that courts should recharacterize advances in bankruptcy as capital
contributions ifno disinterested outside lender would provide similar financing to debtor attime
of alleged loans); see also Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer
Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
1986) (holding that bankruptcy courts do not have authority to recharacterize claims from debt
to equity in bankruptcy proceedings).
192. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.t. 626, 630-32 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (deter-
mining that absent inequitable conduct, courts should not exercise equitable subordination, but
because no disinterested lender would provide similar financing, court could subordinate claim
through recharacterization).
193. Pacific Express, 69 B.R. at 115-16.
194. Diasonics, 121 B.R. at 627-32. None of the notes executed between Ingalls and the
debtor contained repayment terms. Id at 627. Although Diasonics made some payments on
the note, the payments were not made in the ordinary course of business. Id. The interest
charged on the notes was nominal and computed arbitrarily. Id. at 627-28. Some additional
evidence indicated in correspondence to another creditor that Diasonics considered the transac-
tion an investment. Id at 631-32.
195. See id. at 632 (stating that Ingalls presented no evidence that debtor could have
obtained financing from disinterested lender, therefore funds Ingalls advanced were capital
contributions and not loans).
196. See Pacific Express, 69 B.R. at 115-16 (prohibiting bankruptcy courts from recharac-
terizing claims from debt to equity to accomplish subordination).
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The bankruptcy courts' practice of recharacterizing debt transactions
even without inequitable conduct by the creditor will discourage insiders from
making loans to troubled companies.197 Often an insider is the only source of
funds for a struggling company.198 If the insider creditor faces a possibility
of its claim being recharacterized and subordinated even without any inequita-
ble conduct, it will think twice before lending money to a debtor possibly
nearing bankruptcy."' This would make it nearly impossible for companies
such as Diasonics and Pacific Express to borrow money when they need it the
most.
2 oo
Pacific Express avoids this drastic result by requiring courts to find
inequitable creditor conduct through § 510(c) equitable subordination analysis
in order to subordinate a claim in bankruptcy.21 This ruling provides assur-
ance to lenders in the Ninth Circuit that absent inequitable conduct, courts
will not subordinate lenders' claims in bankruptcy proceedings. 2 ThePacific
Express B.A.P. did not want bankruptcy judges to subordinate claims without
applying § 510(c) equitable subordination.2 3 Although the Pacific Express
B.A.P. achieved the result it desired, it appears to have gone too far in prohib-
iting the recharacterization of claims in bankruptcy altogether.
197. See Herzog v. Leighton Holdings, Ltd. (In re Kids Creek Partners, L.P.), 200 B.R.
996, 1020 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996) (noting that advancing funds to undercapitalized debtor is
insufficient for finding inequitable conduct because it would discourage insiders from making
loans to save troubled companies); Braas Sys., Inc. v. WMR Partners (In re Octagon Roofing),
157 B.tR 852, 858 (N.D. I11. 1993) (stating that subordinating claim absent inequitable conduct
would dissuade shareholders with most motivation to save floundering company from advanc-
ing funds).
198. See Octagon Roofing, 157 B.t. at 858 (noting that shareholders are ordinarily most
interested or motivated to save troubled debtor).
199. Id.
200. Ahypothetical example illustrates how allowing courts to recharacterize alleged loans
from insiders as capital contributions would discourage insiders from lending money to
financially troubled companies. Assume C is an insider of struggling debtor corporation D. D
seeks financing, but no disinterested outside lender wants to risk advancing money to D in fear
that D may go bankrupt C, as an insider of D, has an obvious interest in helping D get out of
financial trouble. C wants to help by loaning money to D, but C also wants assurance that ifD
declares bankruptcy C's claim will be treated as a debt with the claims of D's other unsecured
creditors. C is unlikely to advance D money if the bankruptcy court can recharacterize the
advance as a capital contribution based solely on D's undercapitalization and inability to obtain
outside financing.
201. See Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115-16 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (noting
that bankruptcy courts are not authorized to characterize claims and correct analysis is whether
court should equitably subordinate claim under § 510(c)).
202. Id
203. Id
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V Why Bankruptcy Courts Should Be Authorized to Recharacterize
Claims Independent of§ 510(c) Equitable Subordination
In Pacific Express, the Ninth Circuit B.A.P. cited Mobile Steelto suggest
that the issue is not whether the advances were actually loans, but whether
equity requires that courts treat the advances like something other than
loans.2 The majority of courts, however, analyze this situation by addressing
the question of whether an advance is in fact a loan or capital contribution
before they examine equitable subordination.2 5 Courts apply equitable sub-
ordination only to true creditors.2" If a court considers a claim to actually be
an equity contribution, the court will subordinate that claim below other
claimants, but not through § 510(c) equitable subordination.2 7 The court
subordinates the equity contribution because the corporation only repays
equity contributions after it satisfies all other obligations.20 The Pacific Ex-
press B.A.P. failed to acknowledge that these cases actually turn on whether
a debt actually exists, not on whether the claim should be equitably subordi-
nated.209
Pacific Express rejected the recharacterization of transactions because
it determined that § 510(c) governs the result, subordination of claims.
210
204. See id. (stating that "[i]t is important to remember that the issue is not whether the
advances 'actually' were loans, but whether equity requires that they be regarded as if they were
something else" (quoting Benjamin v. Diamond (In re Mobile Steel Co.), 563 F.2d 692, 702
(5th Cir. 1977))).
205. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that
court should decide whether advance is loan or capital contribution before it contemplates equi-




209. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 93 (discussing cases involving whether
alleged debts are actually capital contributions). A simple hypothetical illustrates the absurdity
of this analysis. Assume that C files aproof of claim against debtorD's estate for $1000 based
on C's purchase of D's stock. D files for bankruptcy and C claims that the transaction created
a $1000 debt because it was a loan. The trustee of D's estate denies the claim because the
purchase of stock is clearly an equity investment in the company. All creditors' claims must
be satisfied before shareholders can begin to recoup their investment. In this hypothetical, the
trustee recharacterized C's claim of debt into equity. No reason exists to address the issue of
equitably subordinating the claim because the stock purchase is not even a true claim. Courts
must be permitted to recharacterize transactions of this nature or creditors will always try and
claim their advances were loans.
210. See Unsecured Creditors' Comms. ofPac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Fund-
ing Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (noting that
Code does not provide authority for characterization of claims and § 510(c) governs results of
determinations); In re Lewiston Steam & Power Assocs., No. B86-00477-Y, 1989 Bankr.
LEXIS 1382, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 24, 1989) (stating that recharacterization of claim
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Other courts have stated that debt may be recharacterized as equity regardless
of whether the trustee has satisfied the other requirements of equitable subor-
dination.211 These courts argue that § 510(c) does not prevent a court from
viewing the substance of a transaction over its form and determining that the
claimant took an equity position. 2 2 These courts continue to recharacterize
claims by relying on the authority vested in the bankruptcy court to use its
equitable powers to test the validity of claims.
One reason the application of these two procedures causes so much con-
fusion is that courts sometimes consider the recharacterization of loans as
equity as a subset ofthe bankruptcy courts' equitable subordination powers.2 4
Undercapitalization cases illustrate this confusion because they lead some
courts to equitably subordinate claims that other courts would recharacterize
as equity contributions.2 ' Mere undercapitalization without inequitable con-
duct is generally insufficient to support equitable subordination of a claim.21 6
It is not always clear whether courts will elect to recharacterize a claim based
on undercapitalization even when the claimant acted inequitably.217 This area
from debt to equity is not allowed absent controlling provisions in Code); Pinetree Partners,
Ltd. v. State Teachers Retirement Sys. (In re Pinetree Partners, Ltd.), 87 B.R. 481,490 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 1988) (same).
211. See Summit Coffee Co. v. Herby's Foods, Inc. (InreHerby'sFoods, Inc.), 2F.3d 128,
133 (5th Cir. 1993) (stating that court is authorized to recharacterize loan as equity contribution
even when circumstances do notwarrant equitable subordination); Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121
B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (observing that court should first determine whether
transaction is loan or capital contribution before determining equitable subordination issue).
212. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939) (noting that bankruptcy courts
exercise equitable powers to ensure that substance of transaction does not give way to form);
Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1469
(5th Cir. 1991) (finding claimant's advances more related to equity investment than loan
transaction); United States v. Colorado Invesco, Inc., 902 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D. Colo. 1995)
(discussing merits of recharacterization).
213. See In re Cold Harbor Assocs., L.P., 204 B.R. 904, 915 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997)
(citing Pepperv. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,305-06 (1939)) (discussing court's ability to inquire into
nature of transaction and recharacterize it using equitable powers if necessary); Fett v. Moore
(In re FettRoofing & Sheet Metal Co., Inc.), 438 F. Supp. 726,729-30 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1977)
(stating that bankruptcy court, as court of equity, can disregard appearance of transaction and
determine actual character of transaction between parties).
214. See Blasbalg v. Tarro (In re Hyperion Enters., Inc.), 158 B.R. 555,559 (Bankr. D.R.I.
1993) (comparing two related arguments of recharacterization and equitable subordination).
215. See Diasonics, 121 B.RL at 629-30 (discussing issue of whether undercapitalization
of corporation should lead courts to equitably subordinate claim or to recharacterize as equity
contribution).
216. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting that mere undercapitalization is not
enough to subordinate claim without finding additional inequitable conduct).
217. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626,632 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (determin-
ing that equitable subordination was not justified because of lack of inequitable conduct, but
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is one in which it maybe easier for courts to recharacterize a claim as an equity
contribution than it would be to equitably subordinate the same claim.2 I
One argument for the use of recharacterization of transactions in bank-
ruptcy is that because tax courts use a similar analysis recharacterization of
claims promotes uniformity between the bankruptcy and tax courts. 219 Most
bankruptcy courts employ tax court factors to determine whether to recharac-
terize a claim.10 Some courts reject this analysis and claim that the tax
court's factors concerning recharacterization are irrelevant for a determination
for bankruptcy purposes. 1
Another argument for allowing the bankruptcy court to recharacterize
claims is that it is a court of equity with the power to consider the substance
of a transaction regardless of its form.' The courts use recharacterization to
decide whether a debt exists and not to decide whether to subordinate it.'
Under this line of reasoning, if courts consider the advance to be a capital
contribution, then equitable subordination would be irrelevant.' Equitable
subordination applies only to legitimate creditors.3 If the court determines
that court should recharacterize claim). But see Hyperion, 158 B.R. at 561-62 (rejecting
trustee's contention that mere undercapitalization justifies recharacterization of transaction).
218. See generally Diasonics, 121 B.R. 626. But see Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of
Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R.
112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (avoiding confusion by prohibiting bankruptcy courts from
recharacterizing claims and requiring them to exercise § 510(c) equitable subordination to
subordinate bankruptcy claims).
219. See Pacific Express, 69 B.R. at 115 (observing that lower court applied factors that
tax courts ordinarily used to determine that court should recharacterize claim as equity).
220. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 94 (noting that appropriate standards to use
in considering whether transaction is equity or debt are stated more clearly in tax cases); see
also supra note 140 (outlining factors adopted from tax court decisions to determine if claim
is debt or equity).
221. See Pacific Express, 69 B.R. at 115 (rejecting adoption of standards tax courts used
to serve in review of claims for bankruptcy proceedings); Rego Crescent Corp. v. Tymon (In
re Rego Crescent Corp.), 23 B.R. 958,962 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that legal questions
and policy considerations considered in tax case were far removed from determining whether
courts should treat advances as debt or equity for bankruptcy purposes).
222. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304-05 (1939) (noting that bankruptcy courts
exercise equitable powers to ensure that substance of transaction does not give way to form);
Fabricators, Inc. v. Technical Fabricators, Inc. (In re Fabricators, Inc.), 926 F.2d 1458, 1469
(5th Cir. 1991) (finding claimant's advances more related to equity investment than loan trans-
action).
223. See Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 93 (discussing recharacterization of claims
as subset of equitable subordination).
224. See Diasonics, Inc. v. Ingalls, 121 B.R. 626, 630 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1990) (noting that
courts should consider recharacterization of claim before addressing issue of equitable subordi-
nation).
225. Id.
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that the claimant is not a creditor but an equity holder, then equitable subordi-
nation would not apply.'- 6 The court subordinates the claim as a proprietary
interest because the corporation repays capital contributions only after satisfy-
ing all other obligations of the corporation.'
VI Conclusion
Although different courts incorporate various subtle differences in
determining when to equitably subordinate claims, virtually all courts use
some form of the three-prong test developed in Mobile Steel.- The Mobile
Steel test brings a certain level of predictability for debtors and lenders to
consider when structuring a loan. It is important for lenders to be able to
advance funds to troubled companies confidently without worrying about the
bankruptcy court later deciding that the alleged loan is actually a capital
contribution.2 9 The bankruptcy courts do not want to discourage inside
lenders from attempting to bail out failing corporations with loans. Struggling
companies would be unable to procure financing because insiders are nor-
mally the only lenders willing to help out companies in trouble. The obvious
result if insiders stop loaning money to these troubled corporations would be
an increased number of bankruptcy filings.
In Pacific Express, the B.A.P. held that bankruptcy judges cannot go
beyond the traditional § 510(c) equitable subordination concepts to subordi-
nate claims. 30 This ruling left courts with the requirement of finding inequi-
table conduct by creditors in order to subordinate claims in bankruptcy. This
decision provides assurance to lenders in the Ninth Circuit that courts will not
subordinate their claims to other creditors absent inequitable conduct. Unfor-
tunately, the Pacific Express decision goes too far by completely prohibiting
the courts from recharacterizing claims. Bankruptcy courts should have the
authority to recharacterize claims that are clearly capital contributions.
Otherwise, every time a party makes an equity contribution to a corporation,
they will characterize it as a loan, and the bankruptcy courts will be forced to
226. Id
227. Id; see Herzog & Zweibel, supra note 76, at 94 (noting that capital interests are
contributed to meet obligations of business and are repaid only after all other claimants are
satisfied).
228. See supra notes 46-95 and accompanying text (discussing Mobile Steel case and how
courts apply three-pronged test).
229. See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (explaining how bankruptcy courts'
practice ofrecharacterizing advances will discourage insiders from lending money to financially
troubled corporations on brink of bankruptcy).
230. See Unsecured Creditors' Comms. of Pac. Express, Inc. v. Pioneer Commercial
Funding Corp. (In re Pacific Express, Inc.), 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (noting
that § 510(c) equitable subordination governs subordination of claims).
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accept their characterization. Bankruptcy courts would have to analyze every
disputed transaction regarding possible subordination of alleged claims under
§ 510(c). This would lead to the ridiculous result of bankruptcy courts trying
to determine whether purported loans that are actually capital contributions
should be equitably subordinated.
Courts need to find a middle ground in which good faith loans from
insiders will be protected from recharacterization, but bankruptcy courts will
still be authorized to recharacterize obvious equity transactions. This middle
ground would prohibit courts from recharacterizing insider loans simply
because the debtor was undercapitalized or was unable to procure outside
financing. The factors adopted from the tax court's analysis begin to provide
a reasonable criteria for courts to consider when determining whether to
recharacterize claims.' 31 If bankruptcy courts examine these factors as a
group to determine the true nature of the transaction, they will normally reach
the correct result. It is important for the courts to analyze the factors as a
whole instead of relying on undercapitalization alone to justify recharacter-
ization. This type of analysis will provide more comfort to good faith lenders
who structure their loans correctly. The Pacific Express B.A.P. may have
gone too far in limiting any subordination of claims in bankruptcy to § 510(c)
equitable subordination. However, bankruptcy courts are well advised to
maintain a higher standard for recharacterizing claims than mere undercapi-
talization or inability of the debtor to obtain financial support elsewhere.
Requiring this higher standard for recharacterizing claims will ensure credi-
tors that courts will not treat their legitimate loans as equity contributions
once the debtor files in bankruptcy.
231. See supra note 143 (listing factors considered in determining whether court should
recharacterize claim).
